

Business cycle effects on gender equality^{*}

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Abstract

Swedish parents are entitled to government paid benefits for taking care of sick children. In this paper we show that the gender distribution of paid care for sick children is a good proxy for the gender division of household work. Using register data on paid care for sick children for the whole Swedish population for a ten year period we show that gender equality follows a pro-cyclical pattern. This is in line with the economics of identity explanation to differences in labour market outcomes between men and women. From a European policy perspective it is of interest that the level of unemployment, which varies widely within Europe, affects gender equality. The European Union works for both increasing employment and gender equality. This paper points to a possible link between these two policy areas.

key words: gender equality, time use, unemployment, business cycles

JEL codes: E32,J12,J16,

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1. Introduction

Swedish parents are entitled to government paid leave for caring for sick children. Around two million days of care for sick child are used by parents each year, approximately one third by fathers and two thirds by mothers. Register data of all care for sick children in Sweden in 1993 to 2003 is available for researchers. In this paper we first study the association between the spouse's division of 'care for sick children' and the division of housework in the family. We find that care of sick children is a useful proxy for the level of gender equality in the family. This is valuable, since variables measuring gender equality, especially for non-market activities, are scarce. It opens up the possibility to study the questions related to gender equality that hitherto has not been studied due to the lack of data on gender equality. As an example of such a question, we investigate how gender equality is affected by the business cycle, a question for which time use data are less suitable, due to the lack of high frequency time series on division of housework.

2. Data

We use two data sets, one containing interview and register data of a representative sample of 1/1000 of the Swedish adult population (the Swedish Level of Living Survey), and one data set with register data for the whole population.

2.1 Level of Living Data

The Level of Living Survey contains interview data for a representative sample of the Swedish population between 18 and 76 years of age. The interviews were made in 2000 and provide us with data on among other things the distribution of different types of house work, employment status, working hours, and stated attitudes to gender equality.¹ Further, the data set contains register data on for example wage, total income and care for sick children. Below we describe the variables on care for sick children and house work in some detail.

Care for sick children:

Swedish parents are entitled to care for sick children benefits, paid by the government, when a parent stays at home from work to care for a sick child. The reimbursement level is 80 percent of current income, up to a ceiling. Wages are below the ceiling for most parents, in for

¹ For more detailed information on the Level of Living survey, see Erikson and Åberg (1987).

example 1994 only four percent of mothers and twelve percent of fathers hit the ceiling. The benefit is available until the child turns twelve. One of the parents is usually on parental leave until the child is about one to two years old. When the parents return to work, the child usually starts in kindergarten. The number of care for sick children days peaks when the child is two years old, after that the number of days gradually falls. There is a marked seasonal pattern, with low levels of care for sick children during summers and Christmas holidays. This is because most parents are on vacation during these periods. The care for sick children data covers the period from January 1, 1993 to June 30, 2005.

The total number of observations in the Level of Living Survey is 5141. In our analysis, we include parents of children born in 1990-1998 where both the mother and the father are employed in 2000, and both parents answered all questions used in our analysis. Further, we require that the couple have used at least 10 days of care for sick children. No single parents are included in the analysis. This leaves us with 648 observations. For more details on the construction of the sample, see Section 3.

Table 1 shows the division of care for sick children and house work.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Housework

One of the parents answers the interview questions on hours of house work. There seems to be some bias in favour of the interviewed parent, in the sense that the father (mother) does a significantly higher share of house work when he (she) is the interviewed parent. Total housework is defined as the sum of work on food (preparing, shopping and dishes), washing clothes (including folding and ironing) and cleaning (vacuuming, dusting, and scrubbing).

Fathers do about one third of both house work and care for sick children. There is considerable variation among the households. Figure 1 shows the division of housework and care for sick children for the 87 couples in the sample that have a child born in 1990. In the figure, there is a positive association between the two variables. In Section 3 we will analyze this relation statistically.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

2.2 Register data

All individuals residing in Sweden have a personal identification number, which makes it possible to link administrative registers covering different aspects of individual's life, e.g. income, education, care of sick children parental leave, and linking children/parents. From this information Statistics Sweden have, on behalf of the Level of Living-Project at the Swedish Institute for Social Research, put together the STAR-database (Sweden over Time: Activity and Relations). Here we use data on care of sick children on municipality level from 1993-2003.

3. Care for sick children as a measure of gender equality

It is not obvious how to measure gender equality. Comparing hourly wages for men and women are probably the most common approach. This is one important dimension of gender equality. One drawback of this measure is that the wage structure is affected also by other things than gender inequality. Wages are more compressed in some countries and during some periods of time than others. There is also considerable gender segregation among occupations. Increased supply of female labor, which is usually associated with increased gender equality, therefore depresses women's wages, at least in the short run.

Another way of measuring gender inequality is to study the division of housework. Besides being an important issue in itself, the unequal division of housework is one of the prime suspects for unequal outcomes in the labor market, such as gender differences in career possibilities and wage differences. Almost all data on housework are interview data, and therefore the sample sizes usually are rather small. Further, it is almost impossible to collect historic housework data from interviews.

In this paper, we use register data on care for sick children. One advantage of these data is that we have a huge sample size. Over one million Swedish families have used this benefit during the period we study. A second advantage is that we can follow the development of care for sick children over time.

To show the possibilities offered by using the gender division of care for sick children as a proxy for gender equality, we will investigate how changes in unemployment affect gender equality, measured by the division of care for sick children. We will utilize regional changes in unemployment over time in our econometric analysis. This would be very hard if we were constrained to interview data. First we would have to interview a large sample to get reliable estimates of the local distribution of housework. Second, we would have to interview the persons a large number of times. Finally, we would have to wait a long time between the first and last rounds of interviews in order to get some variation in the development of unemployment between regions. This example shows that the register data can provide a valuable addition to the data sources for studying gender inequality, and it is easy to come up with other examples.

Before we use the register data on care for sick children as a proxy for gender equality, we have to establish that care for sick children is related to the gender division of housework. One can of course argue that the division of care for sick children is an important issue in itself. Being at home with a sick child often causes some costs for the employer and some stress for the employee when returning to work. An uneven distribution of care for sick children is therefore in itself of some interest for a gender equality perspective. However, the division of care for sick children is even more interesting if an uneven division of it is associated with an uneven division of housework in general. In this section we will provide some evidence suggesting that the division of care for sick children is a useful proxy for housework in general.

Table 2 shows how housework and care for sick children are divided between the parents when the sample is stratified on education level and on parents' attitude to gender equality. Mothers with elementary or vocational education take a higher share of both care for sick children and housework than mothers with educational secondary or tertiary education. (Not really true for CSC for elementary education, but there is very few observations in that group.) The same pattern is present when the sample is stratified on father's education. The difference between the educational groups in household work is a result of both longer hours in of household work for men and shorter for women when the mother is highly educated. The same pattern of education being positively correlated with gender equality shows up when the sample is stratified on father's level of education.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

The variable on attitude towards gender equality is not common in time use survey data, and is of course missing in studies on wage data. There is a strong relation in the expected direction between both fathers' and mothers' attitude towards gender equality and father's share of household work. The relation between attitudes towards gender equality and father's share of care for sick children also goes in the expected direction, apart from the share being relatively high when the father states a strongly negative attitude towards gender equality and when the mother states a negative attitude towards gender equality. These subgroups are very small. Therefore we can conclude that the division of both care for sick children and of household work follows the expected pattern when the data is stratified by educational level and attitudes towards gender equality. This is a first piece of evidence on the usefulness of care for sick children as a proxy for gender equality in general.

Now we turn to look directly on the relationship between the division of care for sick children and housework. In Table 3 we show simple OLS regressions of care for sick children on housework for different samples. In the first column we use the whole sample. The point estimate of care for sick children on housework is 0.10 and highly significant. In the second column we restrict the sample to children that are born between 1990 and 1999. If the child is born after 1999 we observe the division of housework before the child is born and we want to estimate housework as a function of care for sick children. The reason for the restriction that children should not be born before 1990 is that the child should not be too old in 2000. The cut of date of 1990 is somewhat arbitrary, but no results in this paper are sensitive to the exact year chosen. As can be seen in by comparing columns 3:1 and 3:2 the point estimate falls somewhat, to 0.087, but is still highly significant. Column 3:3 introduces the restriction that total number of care for sick children days should be higher than 10 over the period for which we have care for sick children data (1993-2005). A very low number of CSC makes the observation of some kind of sharing rule for CSC between the parents shaky. The point estimate for father's share of CSC increases to 0.114 in column 3:3, which can be interpreted as a reduction in the noise in the independent variable.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The next restriction is that both parents should be working in 2000. Total loss of observations amounts to 317, of which 127 is due to missing interview data on employment status. The point estimate change very little when this restriction is introduced. Finally, in the sample used in column 3:5 we must also have data on both parents view on gender equality. The point estimate falls marginally to 0.108. To sum up the findings of Table 3, we find that the relationship between father's share of care for sick children and share of housework is not very sensitive to the choice of sample. Below we will use the most restricted sample from column 3:5 in our econometric analysis. For this sample, there is no missing data for any of the variables we use in our analysis below. Therefore we can use the exact same sample when estimating regressions for models using different independent variables.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

In Table 4 we first regress father's share of care for sick children on father's share of housework, thereafter we stepwise introduce additional explanatory variables. We use data for children born in 1990 to 1999. If there is a common time trend in the division of housework and care for sick children for parents of children born during this period this would be captured by the care for sick children variable in the regression shown in 4:1. We therefore use the birth date of the child as a control variable in 4:2. This results in a small decrease in the point estimate for fathers' care for sick children, giving some indication of a common time trend. However, the estimate only falls from 0.108 to 0.103, so the relationship between the division of care for sick children and housework remains almost as strong after controlling for the child's date of birth.

In column 4:3 we control for the sex of the respondent. We see that there is an effect of this variable. When the mother is interview the father's share of housework falls drastically compared to when the father is interviewed. However, controlling for the sex of the respondent only affects the care for sick children variable marginally.

Next, we introduce father's attitude to gender equality. This variable has a very significant effect. Its introduction also lowers the point estimate for care for sick children. It thus seems that the father's attitude to gender equality affects both the division of household work and

care for sick children. This seems sensible. In most data sets we do not have any measure of father's view on gender equality. In the absence of any measure of views on gender equality, it is therefore good that the care for sick children variable is able to pick up some of this effect. Fathers' stated view on gender equality has a huge impact on the division of housework. Still, the real effect may be even larger, if some father's state a more positive view on gender equality than they actually hold. These fathers may do a low share of both housework and care for sick children, and therefore lower the estimated effect of attitudes and increase the estimated effect of care for sick children. We have no way of verifying whether this is the case, but it may be one explanation to why there after controlling for attitudes still remains a strong relation between the division of care for sick children and housework. In column 3:4 the mother's attitude to gender equality is also included among the explanatory variables. This variable is also strongly significant and of the expected sign, although somewhat a lower magnitude than the attitude variable for the father. The estimate of the CSC variable falls a bit, but is still significant. The estimate on fathers' attitude also falls somewhat, which is explained by a positive correlation between the attitudes of the mother and the father. Finally, we control for educational level for the mother and the father. Doing this lowers the estimates for the other explanatory variables, but not very much.

To sum up, evidence from Table 3 indicates that there is a very significant relationship between the division of housework and care for sick children. This can in part be explained by parents' attitude towards gender equality, and to some degree by parents' education. However, to a large extent, there seems to be an independent effect of CSC on housework. This may be explained by other independent variables and by imperfect measurement of especially the gender equality attitude variables. The division of care for sick children seems to be a useful proxy for the division of housework, especially in cases where parents attitude to gender equality is unavailable. Also in those cases, the division care for sick children seems to be an important proxy for the division of housework, capturing effects not captured by the gender attitudes variables.

We conclude this section by mentioning some results from alternative estimation methods. One alternative to using fathers' share of household work would be to use fathers' hours of household work. The results would be very similar. The point estimate of the effect of the father going from taking none to all care for sick children would be an increase of fathers' household work by two hours.

The share of household work is constrained between zero and one. In our sample of 648 couples, the father does all household work in one case, and the mother in 32 cases. Table 5 shows the results from tobit regressions.

[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]

Comparing Table 4 and Table 5 we find that the results are very similar. The point estimates for the independent variables are in general a little bit higher for the Tobit regressions.

4. How is gender equality related to unemployment?

In the previous section we argued that the gender division of care for sick children is a useful proxy for gender division of housework, which in turn is a very important part of gender equality in general. We hope that this proxy will allow researchers to study gender equality in some ways that has not previously been possible due to lack of data. In this section we pose the question how gender equality is affected by the business cycle. To investigate this issue we need data on housework over a business cycle, and to get precise estimates we need a large number of observations. To our knowledge there are no such data available. We will therefore investigate how the gender division of care for sick children respond to the business cycle.²

The division of housework can be modelled as cooperative decision made by the family, or as an outcome of bargaining between the spouses, see Lundberg and Pollak (1993) and (1996) and Bergstrom (1996). In bargaining models the division of housework is determined by wages and preferences for labor market work and housework for the man and the woman. There is evidence of men having a higher relative preference for labor market work over housework than women. See Evertsson and Neramo (2007) for evidence from Swedish time use data of women *ceteris paribus* doing more housework than men.³ In an economic downturn both men and women face a higher risk of being laid off. The trade off between

² All results in Section 4 are very preliminary.

³ This is a revealed preference, and does not say anything of why this difference in revealed preference exists, be it due to gender roles, or something else. The important thing here is that regardless of the cause to this gender difference in preferences, the bargaining outcome will be affected by it.

doing housework and labor market work will tilt towards doing labor market work when the employer can demand more, due to the risk of unemployment. This will decrease the willingness to do housework for both men and women. The question is if this will have a stronger impact on any of the genders?

Before turning to the estimating the relationship between unemployment and gender equality we have to discuss if there is any other likely channels from unemployment to the division of care for sick children. The most obvious question is whether the business cycle also affects wages in a way that could affect the trade of between labor market work and housework in different ways for men and women. Solon et al (1994) found that men's wages are much more pro-cyclical than women's in the United States for the period 1967 - 1987. A one-percent decrease in unemployment lead to a 1.4 percent wage increase for men, but only 0.4 for women. Using U.S. data for 1978- 1999, Park and Shin (2005) decompose this gender difference into a) difference in wage cyclicity between men and women within each occupation b) occupational differences between men and women. They find that the whole gender difference in wage cyclicity is explained by men being to a greater extent in occupations with cyclical wages. Hart (2006) investigate wage cyclicity in the U.K. 1975-2001 and in contrast to the U.S. studies finds that the cyclical changes of wages in the U.K. are remarkably alike for men and women. There are to our knowledge no studies of the cyclical behaviour of wages for men and women in Sweden. If wages are more cyclical for men, there would be a positive effect on fathers' share of housework, since the alternative cost for housework by the father decreased compared to the alternative cost for housework by the mother. The main hypothesis of this section is, however, that fathers' share of housework should be pro-cyclical. If we find a pro-cyclical an effect below, it can be viewed as a lower bound on this effect, since the wage effect, if there is any, goes in the opposite direction.

4.1 Some evidence from national data time series data

Figure 2 shows the development of unemployment and father's share of care for sick children from 1989 to 2005. Unemployment is very low in the beginning of the period. There is a sharp increase in unemployment in 1991-1993. Thereafter the unemployment level is flat until 1998 when a decrease began continuing until 2001. In the end of the period unemployment again increases somewhat. Fathers' share of care for sick children follows an inverse pattern. It is lower during the period of high unemployment. Eyeballing the figure, one can suspect

that fathers share of care for sick children can be quit well described as being a function consisting of a negative relation to unemployment plus a positive linear trend

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Figure 3 shows the relation between changes in unemployment and changes in fathers' share of care for sick children.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The point estimate of the relationship between the change in unemployment and fathers' share of CSC is 0.426 for the period 1989-2005. The point estimate is significantly negative at the one-percent level. This is very high, given that we have only 17 observations. Using bootstrapped standard errors still yields significance at the one-percent level, so there is not a single observation driving the result. The point estimate for the trend, 0.229, is only significant at the 16 percent level.

To sum up this section, we find some indication of fathers' share of care for sick children being negatively related to unemployment. However, given the small number of observations we would like to do a more powerful test of the hypothesis, and we will turn to that in the next section.

4.2 Municipal panel data

We have register data on unemployment and on fathers' share of care for sick children for the 290 municipalities in Sweden for the period 1993-2003. We use these data to estimate a panel data model of the effects of unemployment on care for sick children.⁴ The labor market facing

⁴ In this section our measure of care for sick children also contains ten days of paternity leave which the father can use in connection with the birth of a child. This leads the fathers' share of care for sick children to increase from about 35 to 43 percent. The only reason for including these 10 days in the measure is that the register data used in this section does not discriminate between the two types of leave. However, we have redone the analysis in Section 3 with a measure which combines care for sick children and the 10 days of paternity leave into one

an individual worker usually consists of a number of municipalities. Statistics Sweden has therefore divided Sweden into 86 local labor market regions, based on actual commuting patterns. We show regression for both the municipal and the local labor market level.

One potential problem when estimating the effect of unemployment on care for sick children is that unemployed people do not need to file for care for sick children in order to stay home from work. We may therefore find an accounting effect of unemployed taking care of children for fewer days. An increase in unemployment that affects men and women asymmetrically may therefore affect the *measure* of care for sick children, rather than real care for sick children. Further, when one spouse is unemployed it in itself may also affect the distribution of care for sick children between the spouses. This is not the effect we are interested in. To circumvent these problems we restrict data to couples where none of the spouses (married or cohabiting) has been unemployed during the period 1993-2003.

[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]

Tables 7a and 7b shows fixed effect panel data estimations on the municipal and local labor market area levels. Some municipalities and local labor market areas have a rather low population, and the gender division of care for sick children may therefore vary between years due to random factors. We therefore also show estimations where we require a minimum population of 20 000 in columns 7:4-7:6.

[TABLES 7a AND 7b ABOUT HERE]

In column 7:1 we show the simple regression with only local unemployment as independent variable. There is highly significant negative effect of increased unemployment on the fathers' share of care for sick children. This is in line with the informal predictions arrived at in the beginning of Section 4. In column 7:2 we add the natural logarithm of local population. The reason for logging the population is that we expect any effect from changes in population to

measure, and the differences in the results are very small. So the measure of care for sick children used in this section should work just as well as a measure only including correctly measured care for sick children.

be proportional to the relative rather than absolute change in population. There is no significant effect of population when measured at the municipal level, but a significant negative effect when measured at the local labor market area level. For our purpose, it is enough that unemployment is still significant and negative after the inclusion of population in the regression. In column 7:3 we also add the change in (the natural logarithm of) the population. Since this is a fixed effects model, and a constant trend in changes in population is picked up by the fixed effects dummies, this variable should be interpreted as the deviation from the long run trend of changes in the population. This can be viewed as a business cycle indicator, since an unusually high increase in the population is likely to be the result of a strong local labor market. This variable turns out to be positive and significant in all regressions, giving further support to fathers' share of care for sick children being positively related to the business cycle (and negatively related to unemployment).

5. Conclusions

This paper aims to making to two contributions. First, to show that the gender division of care for sick children is a useful proxy for the gender division of housework in general. This provides us with a measure of gender equality that can be used when other data on gender inequality is missing. Second, we identify a question - how gender equality is affected by the business cycle - which cannot be answered due to lack of data unless we use the division of care for sick children as a proxy for gender equality. We find (at least preliminary) some evidence of gender equality being pro-cyclical. One can of course ask what to do with this knowledge; it is a bit like saying that it is better being healthy and rich than poor and sick. However, it may be yet another reason for countries suffering from high unemployment to conduct reforms lowering unemployment.

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Figure 1. Scatter diagram for parents of children born 1990, sample used in regressions.




Figure 2. Fathers' share of CSC on left axis, unemployment on right axis.




Figure 3. Change unemployment and change fathers' share of CSC.




Table 1. Descriptive statistics Level of Living data.

	Mean	Median	Share of zeros	Share of ones
Fathers' share of care for sick children	0.340 (0.011)	0.308	0.159	0.034
Fathers' days of care for sick children	16.77 (0.92)	10.5		
Mothers' days of care for sick children	30.94 (1.14)	23.0		
Fathers share of housework	0.311 (0.007)	0.3125	0.049	0.002
Fathers hours of house work/week	7.03 (0.20)	6		
Mothers hours of house work/week	16.05 (0.30)	14		

Note. Standard deviations in parentheses.

Table 2. Division of care for sick children and of household work.

	N of obs	Male share CSC	Male share household work	Father's hours household work	Mother's hours household work
Mother's education					
Elementary	34	0.3820	0.3157	7.00	16.71
Vocational	289	0.3055	0.2751	5.76	16.20
Secondary	84	0.3682	0.3577	8.77	15.45
Tertiary	273	0.3618	0.3263	7.57	15.77
Father's education					
Elementary	49	0.2846	0.2765	5.96	18.29
Vocational	299	0.3350	0.2797	6.26	16.64
Secondary	76	0.3684	0.3147	7.38	15.55
Tertiary	256	0.3471	0.3447	7.75	14.84
Father's Attitude to gender equality					
Level 1 (most positive)	273	0.3679	0.3579	8.27	15.15
Level 2	249	0.3402	0.3080	6.82	15.92
Level 3	78	0.2907	0.2423	5.39	17.76
Level 4	30	0.2186	0.1603	3.70	18.57
Level 5 (most negative)	18	0.3311	0.1947	3.83	19.83
Mother's Attitude to gender equality					
Level 1 (most positive)	332	0.3744	0.3391	7.60	15.23
Level 2	200	0.3230	0.2908	6.75	16.81
Level 3	92	0.2481	0.2847	6.38	16.83
Level 4	14	0.3947	0.2228	4.50	16.86
Level 5 (most negative)	10	0.3049	0.1564	3.50	19.60

Table 3. OLS regressions different samples, dependent variable fathers' share of house work

	<i>3:1 All interviewed</i>	<i>3:2 Children born 1990- 1999</i>	<i>3:3 Children born 1990-1999 and >10 days CSC</i>	<i>3:4 Children born 1990-1999 and >10 days CSC and both parents working 2000</i>	<i>3:5 Children born 1990-1999 and >10 days CSC and both parents working 2000 and data on both parents view on gender equality</i>
Male share of CSC	0.1021** (0.0103)	0.0866** (0.0158)	0.1136** (0.0208)	0.1122** (0.0157)	0.1080** (0.0238)
Constant	0.2737** (0.00502)	0.2708** (0.0079)	0.2594** (0.0094)	0.2636** (0.0093)	0.2745** (0.0106)
R ²	0.031	0.021	0.028	0.034	0.032
N. obs	3194	1494	1161	844	648

Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * indicates significance at the five-percent level and ** on the one-percent level.

Table 4. OLS regression Dependent variable fathers share of housework

	4:1	4:2	4:3	4:4	4:5	4:6
Male share of CSC	0.1080** (0.0238)	0.1032** (0.0238)	0.1011** (0.0229)	0.0850** (0.0222)	0.0791** (0.0224)	0.0745** (0.0219)
Child's date of birth		0.00002* (0.000007)	0.00001* (0.000007)	0.00001 (0.000007)	0.00001 (0.000007)	0.00001 (0.000007)
Female respondent			-0.0694** (0.0132)	-0.0588** (0.0128)	-0.0607** (0.0127)	-0.0586** (0.0128)
Fathers gender equality attitude				-0.0466** (0.0067)	-0.0415** (0.0069)	-0.0398** (0.0067)
Mothers gender equality attitude					-0.0206** (0.0066)	-0.0184** (0.0066)
Education dummies						Included
Constant	0.2745** (0.0106)	0.0625 (0.0898)	0.1962* (0.0898)	0.3172** (0.0890)	0.3545** (0.0901)	0.3398** (0.0932)
R ²	0.032	0.041	0.082	0.1522	0.1556	0.1913
N. obs	648	648	648	648	648	648

Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in paranthesis. * indicates significance at the five-percent level and ** on the one-percent level.

Table 5. Tobit regressions, dependent variable fathers share of housework

	<i>5:1</i>	<i>5:2</i>	<i>5:3</i>	<i>5:4</i>	<i>5:5</i>	<i>5:6</i>
Male share of CSC	0.1115** (0.0216)	0.1066** (0.0256)	0.1004** (0.0246)	0.0872** (0.0222)	0.0808** (0.0215)	0.0761** (0.0232)
Child's date of birth		0.00002* (0.000007)	0.00001* (0.000007)	0.00001 (0.000006)	0.00001 (0.000007)	0.00001 (0.000008)
Female respondent			-0.0772** (0.0155)	-0.0661** (0.0131)	-0.0680** (0.0135)	-0.0655** (0.0144)
Fathers gender equality attitude				0.0491** (0.0085)	0.0439** (0.0072)	0.0421** (0.0069)
Mothers gender equality attitude					0.0216** (0.0065)	0.0191** (0.0068)
Education dummies						Included
Constant	0.2697** (0.00947)	0.0505 (0.0898)	0.1991* (0.0894)	0.3265** (0.0890)	0.3663** (0.0962)	0.3525** (0.0997)
N. obs	648	648	648	648	648	648

Bootstrapped standard errors in paranthesis. * indicates significance at the five-percent level and ** on the one-percent level.

Table 6 Descriptive statistics

Municipal data

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
mshare	3174	0.431	0.0491	0.254	0.686
unemp	3170	5.58	2.45	0.9	13.8
population	3174	30700	56856	2575	761721

Local labor markets

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Obs</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
mshare	957	0.429	.043	0.254	0.667
unemp	957	6.42	2.50	1.4	13.8
population	957	101000	56856	2981	2218929

Table 7a Panel data, municipal level

	Full sample			Municipalities with population>20000		
	7a:1	7a:2	7a:3	7a:4	7a:5	7a:6
Unemployment	-0.189** (0.033)	-0.194** (0.033)	-0.187** (0.033)	-0.356** (0.034)	-0.359** (0.034)	-0.373** (0.034)
Ln(Population)		0.008 (0.025)	-0.013 (0.025)		-0.017 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.026)
Δ Ln(Population)			0.597** (0.108)			0.550** (0.140)
Constant	0.442** (0.002)	0.361 (0.247)	0.573 (0.248)	0.437** (0.002)	0.622* (0.280)	0.753** (0.279)
N obs.	3162	3162	3161	1312	1312	1312
R-squared						

Table 7b Panel data, local labor market areas

	Full sample			Local Labor markets with population>20000		
	7b:1	7b:2	7b:3	7b:4	7b:5	7b:6
Unemployment	-0.295** (0.055)	-0.189* (0.076)	-0.162** (0.075)	-0.336** (0.046)	-0.258** (0.055)	-0.253** (0.052)
Ln(Population)		-0.099* (0.049)	-0.161** (0.050)		-0.123** (0.046)	-0.174** (0.048)
Δ Ln(Population)			1.05** (0.195)			1.31** (0.170)
Constant	0.454** (0.003)	1.45** (0.491)	2.079** (0.500)	0.458** (0.007)	1.70** (0.467)	2.23** (0.450)
N obs.	957	957	957	631	631	631
R-squared	0.4299	0.4326	0.4510	0.5452	0.5508	0.5934